

Problems, Solutions and Requirements

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Requirements engineering conferences

RE'95 & RE'08 stalwarts

Al Davis, Steve Easterbrook, Martin Feather,
Stephen Fickas, Anthony Finkelstein, Orlena
Gotel, Anthony Hall, Connie Heitmeyer,
Matthias Jarke, Marina Jirotko, Axel van
Lamsweerde, Julio Leite, Robyn Lutz, Nazim
Madhavji, Neil Maiden, John Mylopoulos,
Bashar Nuseibeh, Colin Potts, Bjorn Regnell,
Kevin Ryan, Alistair Sutcliffe, Eric Yu ...

... and me! ... and you? ... RE 2021?

... (I had omitted Annie Anton, Dan Berry,
Pere Botella, Leah Goldin, ...)

The first requirements engineer

An old problem

“Requirements Engineering is a new label attached to **an old problem** that has been with the software profession since its inception.”

Michael Harrison and Pamela Zave; Foreword to RE'95 Proceedings



David Caminer

- The first requirements engineer
- Died June 19 2008, aged 92

J Lyons and Co

- Part-financed development of EDSAC
- Designed and built Leo I, Leo II, Leo III
- Supplies ordering system for teashops
 - First ran November 17, 1951
- Staff payroll system
- Whole system fully live in 1954




LEO 1

Requirements engineering

- What kind of **engineering**?
 - Are we like other engineers?
- Artifacts and **problem worlds**
 - What can go wrong?
- Learning from other engineers
 - Radical and **normal design**
- Specialisation
 - **Artifacts**: A missing dimension
- Software-intensive systems
 - **Component structure**
- It may be engineering ...
... but **is it requirements**?

About engineering


What kind of engineering?



Social
Engineering



Clinical
Engineering



Financial
Engineering




Psychological
Engineering



Food
Engineering



Fashion
Engineering



Electoral
Engineering



Political
Engineering

About engineering

Their kind of engineering

“... the design and construction of any **artifact** which transforms the **physical world** around us to meet some **recognised need**.”
G F C Rogers



artifact



physical world
(including human)

- moves people and baggage
- moves as driver directs
- moves on good roads
- moves on earth's surface
- protects from weather
- protects in a collision
- runs on portable power
-

recognised need

Engineering artifacts

Some of their engineering artifacts




Family Car



Ship



Disk Drive



Power Plant



Arch Bridge



Dam



Concorde



Bullet Train



Chemical Plant

Engineering artifacts

Some software engineering artifacts?



Software



Software



Software



Software



Software



Software



Software




Software



Software

The engineering artifact is the system


Requirements engineers know better!



- Our artifact is the system—machine + world + requirement
- The properties of the physical problem world are central
 - A: set of **phenomena shared** between machine and world
 - B: set of **phenomena** mentioned in the Requirement ($A \neq B$)
- The purpose of the system is to monitor & control the world
 - We interact with the machine only through the world
- Different problem world properties \Rightarrow different systems

The engineering artifact is the system

How can we fail?



1. We didn't understand the **requirements**
 - Same priority scheduling applied to all lifts
 2. We didn't understand the **problem world**
 - $\#$ call requests at floor $F = \#$ requesting users at F
 3. The **machine** doesn't ensure the requirement
 - On reversing car direction all outstanding requests are lost
 4. Total development failure gives an unusable system
 - **Multiple unreliabilities** and knock-on effects
- How do established engineering branches reduce these failures?
 - Mathematics? Science? Technology? Production control? ... ?
 - Yes—all of these ... and, crucially, **learning from experience** ...
 - **Specialisation** and **normal**, not **radical** design

Normal design

Radical design

“In **radical design**, how the device should be arranged or even how it works is largely unknown. The designer has never seen such a device before ... has **no presumption of success**: the problem is to design something that will function well enough to warrant further development.”

W G Vincenti; *What Engineers Know and How They Know It*

- Karl Benz 1886 Patent MotorWagen



- 3 wheels
- Solid tyres
- Open cab
- Rear-wheel brakes
- No front springs
- Rear cart springs
- Belt drive
- No gearbox
- Driver in centre
- Steered by tiller

Normal design

From radical to normal design

- **Specialisation** allows **normal design** to evolve
- Radical design, then successive normal designs ...



Karl Benz 1886



Ford Model A 1930



Toyota Camry 1992

“... in **normal design** ... the engineer ... knows at the outset how the device in question works, what are its customary features, and that, if properly designed along such lines, it has a good likelihood of accomplishing the desired task.


W G Vincenti; What Engineers Know and How They Know It

- Normal design and design practice **evolve by learning**
- Normal design and design practice **support learning**

Normal design

Component structure in normal design

- Evolution of standard component structure
 - Fixes learned functionality and efficiency **improvements**
 - Provides repository for **failure avoidance** lessons



- A symptom: **named component types** in a standard structure

Battery

Brake Drum

Brake Pads

Catalytic Converter

Cross-Flow Radiator

Disc Brake Caliper

Distributor

Engine

Fuel Lines

Fuel Tank

Fuel Tank Sending Unit

Gear Shift Selector

Intake Manifold

MacPherson Strut Suspension

Muffler


Rack&Pinion Steering and Column

Radiator Hose

Radiator Pressure Cap

Rotor

Wheel Mounting Studs



Normal design

Normal design: learning to avoid failures

- “Engineering advances by proactive and reactive failure analysis, and at the heart of the engineering method is an understanding of failure in all its real and imagined manifestations.”

Henry Petroski; Design Paradigms

de Havilland
DH106 Comet 1
(metal fatigue)



Tacoma Narrows
Bridge (wind-induced
roadway oscillation)

- Avoiding failure by evolving **normal design**
 - Radical Comet 1: turbojet, 500mph, pressurised
 - Metal fatigue cracks started at **window corners**
- Avoiding failure by evolving **normal design practice**
 - Radical Tacoma Narrows: span/width ratio of 1/72
 - Analyse **vertical roadway oscillation**

Normal design

Attaching lessons to artifacts

- **Tacoma Narrows** lesson
 - Suspension bridge ... **roadway** ... stiffness ... span/width ratio ... wind-induced ... vertical oscillation
- **Comet 1** lesson
 - Turbojet aeroplane ... **fuselage** ... torsion stress ... pressure stress ... metal fatigue ... **aperture corners**
- **Specialisation** attaches lessons to **artifacts and components**
 - Normal design has standard components and ...
... clearly recognised design tasks for them
- Knowledge of **general principles** is very valuable but ...
 - ... harder to call to mind when it's important and ...
 - ... harder to apply for specific artifacts
- Artifact-specific knowledge
 - Particularises a general principle to specific cases
 - Ensures the principle will be applied to those cases


Specialisation

Intensive component specialisation


- Advances in **wooden propellers**
 - W F Durand & E P Lesley: analytical studies & wind tunnel tests, 150 propeller designs, 1915-1926




- Avoiding failures in **flush riveting of metal skin**
 - Douglas, Curtiss-Wright, Bell: research & practical experiments in production engineering, 1930-1950




Round-head rivet



(a)
Machine
countersunk



(b)
Dimpled



(c)
Dimpled into
machine countersunk

W G Vincenti; What Engineers Know and How They Know It

- Small-scale artifact specialisation
 - Intensive specialisation in research and development
 - Focused on artifact/component dimension

Specialisation

Component specialisation cultures

- It takes **more than a village** ...
 - A **specialisation culture**
 - Companies, personal careers, conferences, journals, engineering education, research
- Godden **Structural Engineering** Slide Library
 - Beam structures, Arch structures, Cable and suspension structures, truss structures, Domes and shells, **Columns, frames, grids, slabs**, Construction
- Journal of **Automobile Engineering** Vol 221, No 7 / 2007
 - Jeonghoon Song, Heungseob Kim and Kwangsuck Boo; A study on an **anti-lock braking system controller** and rear-wheel controller to enhance vehicle lateral stability
 - P Hosseini-Tehrani and S Pirmohammad; Collapse study of **thin-walled polygonal section columns** subjected to oblique loads



Specialisation

Established engineering specialisations

- automobile engineering
- aeronautical engineering
- chemical engineering
- civil engineering
- control engineering
- electrical power engineering
- electronic engineering
- mechanical engineering
- mining engineering
- nuclear engineering
- petroleum engineering
- railway engineering
- structural engineering
- ...
- **Multiple dimensions** of specialisation
 - theory: control, structural, fluid dynamics, electronics, ...
 - technology: μ -electronics, welding, pre-stressed concrete ...
 - problem world: civil, mining, human, ...
 - requirement: industrial, transportation, ...
- artifact: cars, power stations, **aeroplanes**, ...
 - component: wings, fuselages, engines, undercarriages ...
 - component: IC engines, electric motors, disk drives, ...

Specialisation

Software engineering specialisations — 1

- Capers Jones's list
 - Chiefly focused on the **software development process**
 - Architecture
 - Cost estimating
 - Customer support
 - Human factors
 - Integration
 - Measurement
 - Network
 - Performance
 - Planning
 - Requirements
 - Reusability
 - Standards
 - Testing
 - Configuration control
 - Database administration
 - Education and training
 - Function point counting
 - Information systems
 - Maintenance and enhancement
 - Package acquisition
 - Process improvement
 - Quality assurance
 - Systems software support
 - Technical writing
 - Tool development

Capers Jones; Software Specialization; Computer July 1995

Software engineering specialisations — 2

- **Generic:**
 - Technologies: eg FP, OO, AOP, ...
 - Theory: eg concurrency, complexity, types, ...
 - Languages: eg Ada, Java, php, ...
- **Artifacts:** chiefly 'system' not 'application' software
 - Infrastructure: eg internet, LAN, relational DBMS, ...
 - Tools: eg compilers, sat solvers, IDEs, model checkers, ...
 - Universal components: eg GUIs, file systems, ...
- **Artifacts:** 'application' software
 - Systems: eg Lift control, automotive, ...
 - Components: eg ABS, CC validation, ATM, ...
 - COTS: eg spreadsheet, WP, OS, ...
- We need more specialisation in '**application artifacts**'

Lessons for software-intensive systems

Learning from Therac-25

- Overconfidence in software
- Failure to eliminate root causes
- Unrealistic risk assessments
- Lack of audit trails
- Safe versus friendly user interfaces
- Careless software reuse
- Confusing reliability (low failure rate) with safety
- Lack of defensive design (eg software checks)
- Complacency about radiation therapy machines
- Inadequate investigation or follow-up on accident reports
- Specification and documentation after development
- Complex designs, dangerous coding practices
- Inadequate module and regression testing
- Poor information display, especially of errors
- User and government oversight and standards




Figure 1. Typical Therac-25 facility.

Nancy Leveson; Safeware: System Safety and Computers

Lessons for software-intensive systems

Learning from Ariane-5

- Hold software qualification review
- Complete closed-loop system testing
- Include external participants in reviews
- Review and extend test coverage
- Failing **sensors** should send best-effort data
- Switch off **alignment function** immediately after **lift-off**
- Review assumptions about **problem world sensor data**
- Pay particular attention to **on-board computer switchover**
- Confine exceptions to tasks, devise backup capabilities
- More data to **telemetry** on any component failure
- Definition of 'critical' should include software failures
- Include **trajectory data** in spec'ns and test requirements
- Pay same attention to justification documents as to code
- Set up team to prepare software qualification procedure
- More transparent cooperation among programme partners



<http://sunnyday.mit.edu/accidents/Ariane5accidentreport.html>

Lessons for software-intensive systems

Learning from London Ambulance System

- High risk implementation approach
- Poor consultation with users and clients
- Inadequate ownership of the system
- **Poorly designed user interfaces**
- Lack of robustness
- Software bugs or errors
- Poor performance
- Software incomplete and effectively untested
- Unjustified wrong assumptions in specification stage
- System didn't fit the organisational structure of LAS
- **Reliance on inaccurate Automatic Vehicle Location System**
- Changing working practices by new computer system.



<ftp://ftp.cs.city.ac.uk/pub/requirements/lascase0.9.ps.gz>


Attaching lessons to components

- The most effective lessons are attached to **components**
 - What's wrong with which part of the system?
- **What are components** in software-intensive systems?
 - One requirement = **response to a stimulus**?
 - "When this button is pressed the motor is turned on"
 - One requirement = **use case**?
 - "One use of the lift conforms to this scenario ..."
 - One requirement = a desired **system property**?
 - "Idle cars wait at ground floor with doors open"

- One component = **subproblem or system function**
 - "The system must manage book loans"
 - "The system must provide lift service"
 - "The system must ensure passenger safety"

Software-intensive system components

Problem, solution and requirement





- Distinct parts of the problem world are **problem domains**
 - Domains and machine all interact by shared phenomena
- Requirement as a satisfaction criterion
 - Machine must constrain Lobby Display and Lift Gear ...
 - ... but not Users, Buttons, or Building Manager


Software-intensive system components

Functional requirements and subproblems



A: Provide lift service as prioritised by the building manager



B: Brake on danger when fault found in lift equipment




C: Operate lobby display of outstanding requests and lift positions for users' information




Software-intensive system components

Further decomposition by data structure

A: Provide lift service as prioritised by the building manager



A1: Provide specified lift service + A2: Edit service priority rules




The priority rules data structure domain decouples the Manager from the Lift Service Provision


Software-intensive system components

Six subproblems = six components


A1: Provide prioritised lift service




A2: Edit service priority rules




B1: Brake on danger (fault detected)




B2: Build lift gear model to detect faults



C1: Operate lobby display




C2: Build model for running display




Software-intensive system components

Specialised subproblem classes

A2: Edit service priority rules



B2: Build lift gear model to detect faults




- A2 is a **workpieces** problem
 - wp problem \Rightarrow intention, convenience, completeness, ...
 - **A2** \Rightarrow semantic constraints, ...
 - **A2** composition \Rightarrow schedule switching, ...
 - **A2** failures ...?
- B2 is a **dynamic model building** problem
 - dmb problem \Rightarrow initialisation, inference, ...
 - **B2** \Rightarrow fault diagnosis, ...
 - **B2** composition \Rightarrow mutual exclusion, atomicity, ...
 - **B2** failures ... ?

Software-intensive system components

Therac-25 workpieces subproblem

PT43: Edit patient
treatment parameters



- PT43 is a **workpieces** problem
 - wp problem \Rightarrow intention, convenience, completeness, ...
 - **PT43** \Rightarrow semantic constraints, ...
 - **PT43** composition \Rightarrow editing/treatment switchover, ...
 - **PT43** failures ...?

PATIENT NAME : TEST	BEAM TYPE: X ENERGY (KeV):	A	1
TREATMENT MODE: FIX		25	
	ACTUAL	PRESCRIBED	
UNIT RATE/MINUTE	0	200	
MONITOR UNITS	50 50	200	
TIME (MIN)	0.27	1.00	
GANTRY ROTATION (DEG)	0.0	0	VERIFIED
COLLIMATOR ROTATION (DEG)	359.2	359	VERIFIED
COLLIMATOR X (CM)	14.2	14.3	VERIFIED
COLLIMATOR Y (CM)	27.2	27.3	VERIFIED
WEDGE NUMBER	1	1	VERIFIED
ACCESSORY NUMBER	0	0	VERIFIED
DATE : 84-OCT-28	SYSTEM: BEAM READY	OP.MODE: TREAT	AUTO
TIME : 12:55. 8	TREAT : TREAT PAUSE	X-RAY	1737.77
OPR ID: T25V02-RO3	REASON: OPERATOR	COMMAND:	


“Under the right circumstances the data-entry phase can be exited before all edit changes are made on the screen.”

Turner and Leveson; Therac-25

Software-intensive system components

Family doctor referral subproblem

P8329: Edit patient
consultancy referral




1. Select diagnosed condition on screen
2. View list of relevant consultants
3. Select consultant, make appointment

- Family doctor may be uncertain of diagnosis ...
 - ... but can refer patient to a known consultant who ...
 - ... can diagnose exactly and either treat or refer on
 - The system does not allow referral without diagnosis
- Staff response
 - Many referrals bypass the system
 - System data is contaminated or incomplete
 - Knock-on effects from resulting consultant appointment

Software-intensive system components

Improved parking brake control

G1927: Control parking brake




- Requirement for new improved parking brake system *
- Button on fascia to set brake
- Automatic brake release when accelerator pedal depressed
- Test driver returns to factory
 - Stops car in front of gates
 - Presses brake-on button
 - Leaves car, walks to gates
 - Starts to open factory gates
 - Brake releases, car moves



* Manfred Broy recounted this story

Software-intensive system components

Access rights & workpieces composition



- Patient records are confidential etc
 - Staff log in and out to access record
 - Full audit trail required: who did what?
-
- Treatment in A&E is often extremely urgent
 - Login takes 15-30 seconds
 - Staff response to difficulty
 - N staff log in at start, log out at end, of shift
 - All staff members use PCs with existing log-ins

A success in NFR engineering

- The **flying qualities NFR**
 - “Stable, responsive, unsurprising, satisfactory to fly”
- The **questions: 1918**
 1. What do pilots really mean by these NFRs?
 2. What artifact properties can achieve these NFRs?
 3. How can designers achieve those artifact properties?
- (Some of) the **answers: 1943**
 - Relationship between stability and control
 - Stick-force vs speed, stick-force/g
 - Elevator-angle gradient, short-period oscillation mode, ...
 - Applies to **normal configuration**: lateral symmetry, straight wing, horizontal and vertical tail at rear

Walter G Vincenti; What Engineers Know and How They Know It, Chapter 3

Engineering or requirements? Don't ask!

← Extreme

ideal requirements

Extreme →

ab initio

- Complete
- Consistent
- Unambiguous
- Measurable
- Stake-holder-friendly
- Implementation-free
- Prerequisite for design
- ...

Impossibly hard!
(assuming radical design)

email, photos, WP, ...

- Dual Core 2GHz
- XP Pro
- 160GB HDD
- 4GB RAM
- DVD±R-DL
- 24" 1920×1200
- WiFi 802.11n
- ...

Much easier!
(relying on normal design)

Engineering and requirements

Engineering or requirements? Don't ask!

← Extreme

ideal requirements

Extreme →


- Complete
- Consistent
- Unambiguous
- Measurable
- Stake-holder-friendly
- Implementation-free
- Prerequisite for design
- ...

- Dual Core 2GHz
- XP Pro
- 160GB HDD
- 4GB RAM
- DVD±R-DL
- 24" 1920×1200
- WiFi 802.11n
- ...


Impossibly hard!
(assuming radical design)

Much easier!
(relying on normal design)


1995



2008




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
Walter
Vincenti



J E Gordon




Levy &
Salvadori



Henry
Petroski




Eugene S
Ferguson



G F C
Rogers


Thank you




Walter
Vincenti



J E Gordon




Levy &
Salvadori



Henry
Petroski



Eugene S
Ferguson




G F C
Rogers

Thank you




David Caminer


Thank you




Walter Vincenti



J E Gordon




Levy & Salvadori



Henry Petroski



Eugene S Ferguson



G F C Rogers

Thank you



David Caminer

... and thank you
all for listening!